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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

~~INTELLIGENCE REPORT~~

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Socialista Lavoratori Italiani) and  
the French Socialists

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SUPPLEMENT

A. Henri Ribiere, the former French deputy, was reportedly sent to Rome by Ramadier on 2 September to talk to Giuseppe Saragat with the aim of promoting the following:

1. To reunite, if possible, the Socialist forces of the PSLI and the PSI to form one large Socialist Party for anti-Communist work.
2. To prevent union with the PSI while it is allied with the Communists.
3. To try to gain PSLI participation in the Government.

B. Ribiere's mission for the duration of which he stayed at the French Embassy in Rome, has been confirmed on essential points as noted in the following report on the relations between the PSLI and the French Socialists.

1. To understand the present orientation of French Socialism, as represented by Guy Mollet, or that directed by Ramadier, it is necessary to review some of the previous political moves which concern the formation of the Socialist Party of Italian Workers (PSLI).
2. Before the split (in the PSLI) the members of the Guy Mollet group were close friends of the "Iniziativa Socialista" Socialists, whom they considered similar to themselves; this is proved by the fact that when Mario Zagari, Matteo Matteotti and Doctors Solari and Libertini went to Paris, they decided to form an Italo-French liaison committee for the same periodical. Zagari, who was directing the international office of the PSIUP (Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria) at this time (September 1945), also tried to devise a means of taking common action on the occasion of the convocation of the International Socialist Conference.
3. Following the split in January 1947, the relations between these adherents were modified for a time, and Guy Mollet, Jean Rous, Yves Dechezelles and Marceau Pivert looked with a certain suspicion on the Socialists who had formed the PSLI with Saragat. Also, Saragat

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himself and men like him, such as Andre Philip, Daniel Mayer and Leon Blum, were looked upon with suspicion for the simple reason that it was believed that Saragat's attempts were too precipitous and consequently doomed to failure within the space of a few months.

4. After the split, the PSLI kept their French companions informed on the reasons for the break and on the development of the new party in Italy.
5. Guy Mollet, however, was extremely rigid in regard to all the PSLI Socialists, and for about three or four months even refused to answer the letters and memoranda which Matteo Matteotti, in his position of director of the international office of the PSLI sent regularly to the SFIO (Section Francaise Internationale Ouvriere - French Socialist Party).
6. On his part, Saragat did not hesitate to continue writing to his personal friends in France, but the only answer he received was "that these friends wanted to see the new party prove itself", "and that they believed there was need to make every effort to overcome disagreements of a personal character, and restore the unity of the party".
7. On the eve of the Socialist Conference in Zurich, the PSLI decided to send Matteotti to France in order that he might inform Guy Mollet on the specific reasons for the split as well as to make him understand the objectives which the PSLI was hoping to accomplish in Italy by developing an autonomous Socialist political line.
8. From that time, or at least from May 1947, relations between the Italian Socialists of the PSLI and the French were restored, or at least friendly relations were initiated which today are becoming stronger.
9. The French Socialists on the eve of the Socialist Conference in Zurich did not hesitate to warn the Italians of the distrust with which they were looked upon by the French Socialists, and consequently to prearm them against any eventual attack. A delegation which went to Zurich, composed of Alberto Simonini, Giuseppe Paravelli, Matteotti and Solari, was thus able to present various memoranda, and thanks to the support of the French, to be heard by the Commission.
10. Above all, the Italians hoped that the French would support their requests to be admitted to the International, at least as observers. The request would have been granted if a dispute had not arisen between the two French delegates, Salomon Grumbach and Leon Boutbien, in which the former declared himself in favor of Nenni and Basso, having been won over by these, while Boutbien on the other hand declared himself in favor of the Saragat PSLI delegates. This impasse produced a paralysis among the French adherents, and resulted in the exclusion of the Italian members of the PSLI as simple observers in the conference.
11. Nevertheless, this episode helped the Italians to form even closer relations with the French and on their return to Italy, Matteotti lost no time in informing Guy Mollet of what had happened and of the ambiguous behavior of Grumbach, whom he accused of permitting himself to be deceived by the PSI fusionists.

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12. Guy Mollet now took a personal interest in the question and began to make detailed inquiries into the events leading to the split in the PSI (*Partito Socialista Italiano*) which gave birth to the new Socialist Party of Italian Workers. He was apparently not content merely with explanatory correspondence but requested on various occasions that Italian delegates of the PSLI come to Paris.
13. The orientation of the SFIO in regard to the PSLI eventually changed. Jean Rous revealed to members of the "Iniziativa" (in a personal letter directed to Zagari, Giuliano Vassalli and Matteotti) the reasons why Mollet and the other members of the party had previously looked with distrust on the PSLI. The basic reason was this: While Mollet was always ready to justify the motives which prompted the directors of the "Iniziativa" in detaching themselves from the PSIUP, he could never justify a Left-wing group such as the "Iniziativa" becoming united at the time of the split with Right-wing elements such as the "Critica Sociale" and Saragat. The latter, Mollet had always considered an agent of the Vatican and of the Americans.
14. This revelation is important in the light of what is happening in the SFIO today, and in view of the following reports which prove that Mollet has always looked on Saragat with hostility. Mollet shows the same hostility toward Ramadier whom he considers the French Saragat. Such an attitude will be reflected in his plan which he is now developing (according to the information the PSLI has been able to obtain) in the SFIO to make the reformist Right-wing of his party a distinct minority, by combatting it until it is impotent. Mollet desired an identical struggle on the part of the Italians against both Saragat and the "Critica Sociale", with whom, however, the directors of the "Iniziativa" allied themselves at the time of the split.
15. However, in view of the lengthy explanations tendered Mollet after the Zurich conference which were bolstered by the facts which Jean Rous brought to its attention, the PSLI decided to send always men belonging to the "Iniziativa Socialista" to France. Consequently, as a result of repeated invitations, Virgilio, Dagnino, Lucio, Libertini, Matteo Matteotti, and Vassalli (all of the "Iniziativa") went to Paris for various meetings and conferences, and eventually succeeded in reingratiating themselves with Mollet and the others, thereby effecting the reestablishment of relations between the PSLI and the SFIO.
16. The PSLI emissaries found an open defender in Marceau Pivert, who urged Mollet to disown and withdraw his official approval of the Basso-Nenni Party, and give it to the PSLI. It was actually Pivert rather than Guy Mollet who insisted on maintaining relations with the Italians, and facilitated their trips to Paris. From Pivert came the formal promise that the SFIO would support the PSLI rather than the PSI at the next conference of the International in December.
17. The definitive resolution of this change was the disavowal of Grumbach's work, which was judged harmful to the Party and as a result of which Grumbach was stripped of all authority in the Party's International political program, control of which was assumed by Boutbien, the friend of the PSLI.

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18. When the Socialist Congress was held at Lyons, Nenni's deputy Basso was surprised to find an unexpected guest in the person of Virgilio Dagnino, who had been sent by the PSLI on the invitation of the French, and sat at the President's table. Fivert made a vigorous speech in full session against the Nenni followers, favoring the PSLI saying that the latter was composed of true Socialist and internationalists. Following this speech, statements by Guy Mollet (attributed to the intervention from Paris of Corrado Bonfantini, editor of the Turin Mondo Nuovo) resulted in formal statements of adherence in favor of the PSLI.
19. In spite of the present day attitude of the SFIO toward the PSLI, or rather, toward the men of the "Iniziativa Socialista", it is still necessary to examine the behind-the-scene facts which explain this excessive sympathy of Guy Mollet's and his friends for the new Socialist Party. The truth of the matter is that Mollet is using the PSLI to sharpen his dealings with the faction led by Ramadier, which he is known to oppose.
20. For this reason, it is necessary to insert several episodes which explain among other things the disavowal of Grumbach (who belongs to the reform group), and the fight which Mollet is waging against Ramadier.
21. It must be noted that while Guy Mollet has completely reversed his position vis-a-vis the PSLI, the right wing members of the SFIO have not done likewise. They accuse Guy Mollet of wishing (by such maneuvers) to work on an international plan for the establishment of a strong autonomous left wing group, from which reformists and social democratic elements would be excluded. This long-term strategy of Mollet's is reportedly at the bottom of his excessive sympathy for the PSLI, or rather for the men of the "Iniziativa Socialista".
22. In regard to the PSLI, Ramadier is following a program completely different from Mollet's or that of the Party. While he does not look on Saragat with hostility, he is trying in every way to reunite the PSI and the PSLI, for he is convinced that this would produce a Party in which the Italian Left wing (like that of Mollet) would end up as a minority, as they were in the old PSIUP. Ramadier is consequently one of those who hope that the Italian factions in direct opposition to the Mollet plan, will reunite in one strong Socialist Party.
23. It is better for Ramadier, or rather for his policy, to have a large united Socialist Party which would inevitably be social democratic in color, rather than a Party which is weak, but in which leftist elements like the "Iniziativa" could prevail or impose a policy more or less similar to that of Mollet, who is consistently intransigent in regard to the Government's policy.
24. To prove this fact, there are two incidents which show how Ramadier works diplomatically in regard to the PSLI, and particularly to Saragat.

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25. About a week ago Saragat received a personal letter from Blum and communicated the contents to the members of the Directorate. In the letter Blum expressed sympathy for the PSLI Socialists and particularly for Saragat, but at the same time he urged them to make every effort to restore the Socialist Party's unity. The letter naturally implied that he did not in the least wish for the return of a new Socialist movement refounded on fusionist position, but on Social-democratic foundation.
26. A few days after he received this letter, Saragat was asked to a conference with Henri Ribiere, who had been purposely sent by Ramadier on "important Party and government matters". The conference was held in the Rome Directorate of the PSLI; Saragat and Vassalli, Party Secretary, were present. The French deputy asked for information on the Italian situation, or rather, on the Socialist Parties.
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27. [REDACTED] Vassalli, quickly told Ribiere of the disputes still existing in the PSI, where there was a strong faction opposing the Basso-Nenni policy as being too close to the Communists. For a number of personal and professional reasons, and also because of their timidity, these men have not been able to make the present PSI Directorate a minority group, with the result that the Basso-Nenni group blocked every attempt to clarify policy. Because of this, in their relations as "good neighbors with the PSI", the PSLI members have come to work on a level of personal approaches and relations, founded on contacts - but not on a political level. Vassalli also mentioned the repeated secret meetings, from which Basso and Nenni were excluded, between Saragat, Lombardo of the PSI, Silone and other PSI delegates who were inclined to see the two Parties reunited.
28. Ribiere then said that Ramadier considered the Italian situation very dangerous, and that the exclusion of both Socialist Parties from the government could do nothing but aggravate the situation. It prevented, furthermore, a fuller collaboration in the Marshall Plan, a project on which the French and Italian Socialists should have been able to meet and find common bases of agreement. Ribiere then asked about the future of the De Gasperi Government, and if there were any chance that the PSLI might enter it.
29. Saragat replied that De Gasperi had sent out feelers for a cabinet regrouping, but that as far as he (Saragat) personally was concerned the entry of the PSLI into the government was dependent upon a complete change of government. Saragat added that he hoped to decide the problem at the next Party conference in mid-September.
30. Vassalli also pointed out in this connection that there were, in general, two strong factions in the party, one favoring collaboration with the other demanding the exclusion of the Rightist Christian Democrats as the condition for collaboration. The latter group, he said, could broadly be identified with the Youth Forces and the "Iniziativa" group, among whom he also noticed a faction very similar to that of Guy Mollet.
31. Ribiere then said frankly that a rapprochement among the Socialists in which old polemics and old disputes were forgotten, would be favored by Ramadier and other international Socialists, because a new Party unity would give Italy a solidarity of deputies and thus permit her to have a government similar to Ramadier's. This type of government,

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he explained, "would enjoy much international support", and if it were accomplished in Italy, would strengthen the Ramadier regime, which is the target of strong Communist opposition, and is not too well supported by the directors of the SFIO.

32. Vassalli replied that the PSLI was favorably disposed, in principle, to a reunion of Socialist forces, and expressed the opinion that a strong united Party would be in a position to attack the problem of the formation of a new government with a more stable foundation. However, a series of difficulties stood in the way of such an achievement, among which figured the sectarian loyalties of the PSI directors who recently preferred to align themselves with the Communists, rather than with the PSLI, to form a single ticket (Blocco del Popolo) in the Rome administrative elections. Vassalli further cited a series of incidents (as well as of aggressions and violent acts) through which the PSI tried to hamper the activity of the Saragat Socialist Party.
33. Ribiere left, saying he would report to Ramadier on the Italian situation. He expressed a parting hope and desire that all obstacles would be overcome, and the reunion would occur very shortly, not only for reasons of internal stability, but also to avoid breaks in the international collaboration of the Socialist Parties of various countries.
34. This discussion was interpreted in different ways by the two PSLI members. Saragat considered it an attempt by Ramadier to institute a policy similar to his in Italy, a fact which would strengthen his and Saragat's position in the domestic and international field. Vassalli, however, considered it a demonstration of the inefficiency of the Ramadier government, which realized it was losing ground every day and therefore, sought every support, even from a PSLI Socialist whom it had neglected until a few months ago, and also as a proof of the dissension existing between Mollet and Ramadier.
35. To this episode must be added the facts which were reported by the PSLI delegate who was sent to England and France to inform the Socialists of those countries on the Italian situation. Dr. Valerio Agostinone, attache to the PSLI International office, and Matteotti, were sent to England and France to inform the Socialists of those countries on the Italian situation and to establish personal contacts with the leading representatives of Socialism there.
36. In England Agostinone talked with Denis Healy, International Secretary of the Labor Party, and found the Labor Party extremely favorable to the PSLI, although not openly so. Healy expressed the hope that the PSLI would not have to enter the government at the moment because they would end by playing the Demo-Christian game without guarantees of any kind. Furthermore, their participation in the government would compromise the possibility of a future accord with the PSI Socialists who would remain members of the opposition, isolated with the Communists.
37. In France, Agostinone spoke with Jean Rous, Pivert, and finally with Guy Mollet and received confirmation of the favorable attitude of the SFIO toward the PSLI, an attitude which it intends to maintain. Agostinone was also permitted to talk with the members of the SEMUA delegation and met with the same attitude. Also, Guy Mollet authorized Agostinone to report to the Party Secretariat that the PSLI must divorce

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itself from reformist and collaborationist positions and put the policies of the parliamentarians and of men like Ramadier in the minority if they wished to keep the sympathies of the SFIO alive.

38. He also said that he, Mollet, was personally guilty of being too vacillating in regard to Ramadier and governmental policies, but after the congress of Lyons he intended to put an end to such a policy by giving Ramadier a very decisive challenge. Therefore, he intends to call a Special Congress very shortly in which Ramadier will be given these conditions by the Secretariat: either resign from the government (since he has not respected the decisions reached by the Congress of Lyons) or be expelled from the SFIO. The same would be done to the parliamentarians who were too favorable to the collaborationism of Ramadier. Mollet further told Agostinone that if this situation came to pass and the SFIO Secretariat were forced to expel Ramadier and his followers from the party, it would undoubtedly inflict a decisive blow on the party at the electoral level but he and his friends believe that this operation is necessary to create, once and for all, a modern and determined Socialist party in France which would not be continually hounded by the Rightist reformers.
39. Mollet told Agostinone that he was perfectly informed on the Italian situation and was following the developments of the struggle within the PSLI with interest. He also hoped that the autonomist Left wing of the "Iniziativa Socialista" would gain the ascendancy over the collaborationist Right wing. His own hope was that the left wing of the PSLI would show equal courage in extreme circumstances and when it had to make grave decisions, and would feel that it had to support the French members in the long-term work. Mollet added in the talk (which was held in the presence of Rous and Pivert) that he was in complete sympathy with Tagari, Matteotti, and Vassalli to Saragat's Critica Sociale group, and his own opinion was that the PSLI would shortly find itself faced with the same decision that he was forced to take.
40. On the problem of Socialist unity, he approved the conduct of the Italian group which intended to go beyond the individual and personal relationships and state the problem in its true political terms in such a way as to make it an issue with the masses. He concluded by saying that in his opinion there was no need of sectarian positions and that he desired to establish a political platform of autonomous and revolutionary Socialism in which he could enroll the Left-wing and the PSLI and the forces of the Left, but not the fusionists who remained in the PSI. This is the state of relations now existing between the PSLI and the French Socialists. It is evident that the conflict between Ramadier and Mollet will eventually have its effects on the future of the Saragat Socialists.

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